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CASES NOTED
refused to accept conclusions in the name of "science" which would be rejected
if presented under any other authority. 0
FEDERAL TAXATION-STOCKHOLDERS' SALE
OF ASSETS OF LIQUIDATING CORPORATION
Plaintiff corporation's stockholders, at all times carrying on negotiations
for themselves and not the corporation, caused. the company to be dissolved and
the physical assets to be distributed to themselves as a liquidating dividend.
They thereupon sold the assets to another corporation, the entire procedure
being for the avowed purpose of avoiding double taxation. Plaintiff corpora-
tion brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover a tax deficiency assessment,
the tax having been paid and a claim for refund disallowed. Held, this was a
sale of assets by the stockholders as individuals and not a sale by the corpora-
tion. The corporation was therefore entitled to a refund. Cuinberland Public
Service Company v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 843 (1949).'
In recent years the courts have been confronted with an ever-recurring
problem as to whether or not the sale of assets by a liquidating corporation
through its stockholders is taxable both to the corporation and to the stock-
holders. This question generally arises where a corporation is owned by a small
number of stockholders 2 who are disposing of all or nearly all of the physical
assets of the company, and the current market value of the assets exceeds
10. The admissibility oi evidence obtained by use of the "Harger Drunkometer" is on
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. Because the defendants' submission to the
drunkometer had been voluntary, the matter of constitutional rights was not in issue.
This case points this out by showing that though a so-called test be taken voluntarily, its
results still are not admissible until the prosecution has carried the burden of showing that
it really is a "test," and a test of sufficient soundness to sustain expert testimony based
upon it. The court attempts to dispel the tendency to confuse the constitutional right against
self-incrimination with the totally irrelevant matter of the dependability of a given "test."
1. Cert. granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 88 (1949). But cf. Kaufmann v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.,
175 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1949) (This decision, one week prior to that of the instant case,
ruled that where negotiations were begun by a corporation before the commencement of
liquidation proceedings, the sale, though subsequently cast in the form of an agreement
with the stockholders, was actually made by the company).
Ia. After this Note was approved the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
instant case, United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 4076
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1950), P-H 1950 FEn. TAX SEav. 72,006. Said Mr. Justice Black, 18
U.S.L. W.a at 4077, "While the distinction between sales by a corporation as com-
pared with distribution in kind followed by shareholder sales may be particularly shadowy
and artificial when the corporation is closely held, Congress has chosen to recognize
such a distinction for tax purposes."
2. E.g., Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (corporation had two
shareholders and its president was husband of the principal stockholder) ; Fairfield Steam-
ship Co. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir. 1946) (liquidating corporation 100% owned
by the corporation negotiating the sale) ; Cumberland Public Service Co. v. United States,
83 F. Supp. 843 (1949) (two men and their families owned all of the stock).
3. See Ayers, Stockholder or Cotporate Sale of Assets in Liquidation as Affected by
Court Holding Company and Howell Turpentine in N.Y.U. INsriTur" ON F.DERAL
TAXATION 364 (6th Annual ed. 1947).
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their book value.3 It is done solely to avoid the corporate tax, 4 in accordance
with the right of taxpayers to decrease or avoid potential taxes by legal means.5
Tile Supreme Court, in the leading case of Cin missioner v. Court Hold-
ing Company,0 dealt with a somewhat similar situation. The corporation itself
began negotiations, withdrew, and after a liquidating dividend in kind the
stockholders sold the assets to the same purchaser. The Court concluded that
the intervening steps were merely formal devices to avoid tax liability and that
the company never abandoned the sales negotiations.7
In an effort to adhere to tile Court Holding Doctrine a variety of artificial
distinctions, based mainly upon chronology,8 have been created. Where the
stockholders have coinntenced negotiations in their own name the courts have
usually ruled against the corporate tax,9 but where they were begun by the
corporation and later carried on by the stockholders payment of both the cor-
porate and individual taxes was generally required) 0 In many of these cases
the courts have made a nebulous distinction between the company and the
shareholders which for all practical purposes were identical since the company
was completely controlled by one or a very few stockholders.1 And in nearly
all of these cases there existed the same broad purpose-sale of the corporate
assets and a legal avoidance of double taxation.12 It has been recognized that
recent decisions on this point are in a highly confusing state.' 3
The principal case can be distinguished from the Court Holding Company
decision in form but not in substance.' 4 Taxpayers should not be subjected to
the hardship of being treated differently on the same question in different
courts. The Supreme Court, having granted certiorari in the instant case, 15
may judicially resolve a uniform doctrine, sounder and clearer than the one
now followed. Legislative action may well be the best solution to the problem.
4. U.S. Treas. Reg. IlI, § 29.22(a)-20 (1943). ("No gain or loss is realized by a
corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquida-
tion, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition.")
5. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) United States v.
Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (U.S. 1873).
6. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
7. Id. at 334. Mr. Justice Black stated, "... the transaction must be viewed as a
whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the consummation of the
sale, is revelant. A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a sale
by another using the latter as a conduit through which to pass title."
8, See notes 9 and 10 infra.
9. Howell Turpentine Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 162 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1947);
J. T. S. Brown's Son Co., 10 T.C. 840 (1948) ; Acampo Winery and Distilleries, 7 T.C.
629 (1946). Contra: Fairfield Steamship Co. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir. 1946).
10, Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Kaufmann v. Comm'r of
Int. Rev., 175 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1949).
11. See note 2 supra.
12, Ayers, supra note 3.
13. See Freeland, Recent Trends in the Court Holding Co. Principle in N.Y.U.
INSTITUTh: oN; FEDFsRsAL TAXATION 369 (7th Annual ed. 1948).
14. See P-H 1949 F. TAx SaRv. ff 28.201.
15. See note 1 supra.
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A recent bill,' intended to give taxpayers an outlet for avoiding this double
tax, 17 died when the Senate of the Eightieth Congress failed to pass it lefore
adjournment. It is indeed possible that the instant decision and its many recent
counterparts may force Congress to act soon with a similarly designed bill.
MONOPOLY-DIVESTITURE AS REMEDY
FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF MOTION PICTURE COMPANIES
An anti-trust action under the Sherman Act ' was instituted in 1938
against the eight leading motion )icture companies and their subsidiaries.2 The
complaint alleged that these companies, through their integration of produc-
tion, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures, had conspired in restraint
of trade and had formed a concerted monopoly, discriminatory in nature. The
Government sought divestiture 3 and other equitable relief against further
violation of the Sherman Act and injunctive relief against specific unfair and
discriminatory practices. 4 The lower court's opinion 5 was that a system of
competitive bidding by exhibitors, separately for each picture and theatre,
would eliminate block-booking 0 and blind selling 7 and render divorcement
unnecessary. Upon appeal by both sides the Supreme Court remanded the case
for a determination of the effect of vertical integration in the industry and
16. H.R, 6712, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 129 (1948) (proposed Revenue Revision Act
of 1948).
17. H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1948): 1 RAKITN AND JOHNSON.
FEDE, AL INCOME Gi' AN) EsTATE. TAXATION 1318 (1947 ed.) ; Freeland, supra note 13.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
2. The defendants were: Paramount Pictures, Inc.; Paramount Film Distributing
Corp.; Loew's, Inc.: Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.; RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.; Kcith-
Albee-Orpheun Corp.; RKO Proctor Corp.; RKO Midwest Corp.; Warner Bros.
Pictures. Inc.; Vitagraph, Inc.; Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.; Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp.; National Theatres Corp.; Columbia Pictures Corp.; Co-
lumbia Pictures of La., Inc.; Universal Corp.; Universal Film Exchanges, Inc.; Big
U Film Exchange, Inc.; and United Artists Corp.
3. Divestiture and dissolution are commonly used remedies for anti-trust violations.
While there is some distinction between the two there is no definite rule of application.
The courts apparently use that remedy which they deem most appropriate. Generally,
divestiture is forcing a corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of some portion of its
holdings. Dissolution consists of splitting the entire corporation into its component
parts.
4. Five of the major companies (Paramount Pictures, Inc.; Loew's, Inc.; Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp.; Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.; and Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp.) entered into a temporary consent decree with the Government in 1940 under the
terms of which a status quo was maintained for three years and an arbitration system was
established. Although the consent decree lapsed before the issuance of the District
Court's opinion in 1946 the "majors" continued to comply with its provisions.
5. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See
also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
6. "Block-booking is the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature
or group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or
group of features released by the distributors during a given period." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
7. "Blind-selling is a practice whereby a distributor licenses a feature before the
exhibitor is afforded an opportunity to view it." United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 n.I1 (1948).
